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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW REVIEW
Volume 62

June, 1960

Number 4

A BRIEF SURVEY OF THE
WEST VIRGINIA LAW OF COMPENSABILITY*

WnLikm_

DEA

DE LA MATm**

to the passage of the West Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act in 1913, the slow moving common law procedures
provided the only forum for the enforcement of the employer's
obligation to use due care toward an employee while he was on
the job, subject, of course, to the three common law defenses.' As
a result of these three defenses, the employer was able to defend
advantageously about seventy per cent of the common law actions.
The enactment of the compensation law eliminated the common
law action against a subscriber and provided a speedier remedy
to the injured employee. Thus, the benefits of chapter 23 are
two-fold.2 The employer, by becoming a subscriber to the fund,
is protected from suits in the courts and the resulting verdicts while
the employee is provided with a relatively speedy remedy at a time
when he needs it most. It is also advantageous to the employee in
that the question of fault or negligence on the part of the employer
is no longer a considered factor and he is not barred by his own
fault unless it is the result of his wilful misconduct or intoxication.
These rights and remedies are put into effect by the contractural relationship between the employee and his employer,
resulting from the statutory provisions giving the employer the
PRIOR

* This paper was originally delivered at the 1959 meeting of the Administrative Law Section of the West Virginia Bar Association.
**Attorney, Legal Division, West Virginia Workmen's Compensation
Fund. The opinions expressed are those of the writer and do not necessarily
represent the view of the Workmen's Compensation Fund.
1 These were the defenses of contributory negligence, fellow servants
negligence,
and assumption of risk.
2
Reference to code provisions throughout the text are to W. VA. CODE
(Michie 1955). Unless otherwise specified, references to articles and sections
without reference to some other chapter of the code are references to Chapter

23.
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right to subscribe to the compensation fund and the requirement
of notice to the employees of such election. Thus, the employer
agrees to contribute to the fund while the employee agrees to waive
his right to assert any claims against his employer except for the
benefits provided by chapter 23.3 Such agreements are treated
as contracts of employment, interpreted and enforced as all other
contracts and as binding upon the parties for injuries or death
sustained in any place to which such contracts of employment
extend the rights of the parties. 4 The primary problem, then, to
be considered is the compensability of a claim, this being a term
used to denote the validity or invalidity of the claim filed by an
employee, and, as such, it is the initial and perhaps the most important determination which is made regarding such a claim.
To institute a claim for compensation from the fund, it is
incumbent upon the employee to file his application in the office
of the Commissioner within one year from and after the date of
injury. This application is to be made on the form prescribed
by the Commissioner, currently designated as Form C. D. 6. 5
First, considering the period in which an application for compensation must be filed, the West Virginia Supreme Court held in
Young v. State Compensation CoMarr,6 that while the plea of the

statute of limitations may be waived in the ordinary case, a public
official cannot waive a statute which permits him to consider only
such claims as are filed within a particular period. He has no more
right to do so than a personal representative would have to waive
the Statute of Limitations which had run in favor of his decedent.
The court went on to consider all the aspects of article 4, section
15, and cited with approval Poccardi v. Ott,7 in which it was held
that an application for compensation must be filed within the
requisite period in the office of the Compensation Commissioner,
and that the use of the mails, the date of mailing or posting, the
risk of delay in delivery, even where war is being waged, cannot
be used to suspend the operation of the statute. Further, the
employment of an agent or the use of any agency to bring about
a particular result, is made at the risk of the principal, so if the
agent fails in his duty, or the selected agency fails to function, the
3
Hardin v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd, 118 W. Va. 198, 180
S.E. 670 (1937).
4 Gooding v. Ott, 77 W. Va. 487, 87 S.E. 862 (1916).
5 See W. VA. CoDE ch. 23, art. 4, § 15 (Michie 1955).

6

121 W. Va. 126, 3 S.E.2d 517 (1939).
88 W. Va. 166, 98 S.E. 69 (1919).
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consequences thereof must fall on the principal. The court went
on to say that there was no authority to be found which placed
upon the employer the duty of filing the employee's application.
The employee must actively participate to the extent of not only
seeing that his application is completed and signed, but also filed
in the Commissioner's office within the statutory period. In no way,
manner or means can the employer be held to be an agent for the
Commissioner.
In France v. Workmeds Compensation Appeal Bd.,8 the court
stated with approval, in considering the form of application, that
where a statute requires the filing of an application on a form
prescribed by the Commissioner, anything of less dignity would
have no force or effect in the prosecution of a claim for compensation. Thus, it is the prevailing law, as set forth by the supreme
court, that the employee must not rely upon anyone for the filing
of his application within the requisite one year period at the office
of the Commissioner on the form prescribed. This is the employee's
mandatory obligation in the prosecution of his claim and such obligation cannot be waived by the Commissioner.
Numerous claims have been rejected on this ground alone
regardless of the date of completion of the application or the date
of the postmark. Upon receipt of any and all mail, or other papers
however received, each document is stamped in the Commissioner's
mail room with the date filed. It is this date which is controlling
in determining the time of filing in all cases and the jurisdiction
of the Commissioner to consider the application. The first factor,
then, which is considered in determining the compensability of a
claim is, was it timely filed?
The claim is then referred to the accounting division in order
that it may be ascertained whether the given employer was a
subscriber to the fund at the time of the injury. The West Virginia
Code provides,9 in part, that failure to pay premiums or to make
the quarterly reports as required shall deprive the employer of the
benefits and protection afforded by chapter 23, and shall automatically terminate the election of such employer to pay into the
fund. This provision applies not only to those who have never
been subscribers to the fund but, likewise, to those who had, at
one time, elected to participate but who, at the time of the injury
8 117 W. Va. 612, 186 S.E. 601 (1986).
9 W. VA. CODE, ch. 28, art. 2, § 5 (Michie 1955).
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for which the application was filed, had been suspended for nonpayment of premiums. Time after time, an application must be
rejected on this account-the employer was not a subscriber to the
fund at the time of injury.
Next, it must be shown that the claimant was, in fact, an
employee within the meaning of chapter 23, article 2, section 1. This
section provides that all persons in the service of a subscribing
employer and employed for the purpose of carrying on any industry, business or work in this state are employees within the meaning
of chapter 23 and subject to its provisions.
As a general rule, then "employee," as it is used in this section, is applicable to all persons in the service of the employer
as defined. However, by its specific terms, section 1 of article 2
makes certain inclusions such as persons regularly employed in
West Virginia whose duties necessitate employment of a temporary
or transitory nature by the same employer without the state. Thus,
where a West Virginia employee is injured while in another state
and while performing his duties in accordance with his employment
and directly incidental to carrying on an industry in West Virginia,
and such visit in the state was merely temporary, the claimant
would be an employee within the meaning of this provision and
entitled to compensation under the West Virginia act. However,
if an individual, though employed by a West Virginia employer,
was employed to perform his duties in another state, there being
no intetnion that he ever be employed in West Virginia, and was
injured in the other state, he could not be compensated under our
act. Section 1 of article 2, while containing these several inclusions,
also excludes from coverage certain persons as in the case of a
member of a firm of employers, or any official of an association or
of a corporation employer, including managers, or any elective or
appointive official of the state, county, county court, board of edu.
cation, municipality or other political subdivisions of the state whose
term of office is definitely fixed by law. The last portion of this
provision is clear in that any and all elected or appointed officials
of the named agencies whose term of office is definitely fixed by
law are excluded from the benefits set out in chapter 23.
The first part of this provision, however, has posed some problems. In the case of West Virginia Coal & Coke Corp. v. State
CompensationComm'r,10 the supreme court held that the sole official
10 116 W. Va. 701, 182 S.E. 826 (1935).
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of a company having managerial duties must be deemed a manager
in fact as well as in name, and, as such, is definitely excluded from
the protection of the act. The following guide was expressed by
the court. "The situation must be gauged by the duties and responsibilities of the person in question, and not by the name that
is applied to his position. .. ."' Thus, realizing that this case
applied solely to the case of a "manager," the difficulty arises concerning the legislative intention regarding a member of a firm of
employers, or any official of an association or of a corporate
employer. There is no case law in West Virginia relating to these
persons, but a search of other jurisdictions in which there are
similar statutes reveals that such persons are definitely excluded
from the protection of the fund regardless of what they were doing
at the time of injury.
Therefore, pursuant to the above discussion, an official of a
corporation, elected or appointed according to charter or by-laws,
is definitely excluded from the benefits of the fund as not being
an employee within the meaning of the act.
The particular section now under discussion, section 1 of
article 2, also provides that this chapter shall not apply to persons
whose employment is prohibited by law. With this exclusion, the
claim of a minor who was employed in a proscribed occupation or
while under a specific age is the situation with which we are
generally concerned.
In the first instance, the payment of premiums into the fund
does not protect an employer against the action of a minor unlawfully employed by him and, in such cases, the rights and liabilities
of the employer and employee are controlled by the common law
12
principles applicable to master and servant.
In the second instance, the unlawfully employed minor would
be precluded from the benefits provided by the fund.' 3
However, it is to be noted, and as already impliedly pointed
out, that nothing in our Workmen's Compensation Act prohibits
an employer, who qualifies thereunder, from engaging the services
of a minor simply because he is, in fact, a minor. The statutory
inhibitions against the employment of minors in West Virginia are
11 Id., at 702, 182 S.E. at 827.
12 Jackson v. Monitor Coal & Coke Co., 98 W. Va. 58, 126 S.E. 492
(1925); Morrison v. Smith-Pocahontas Coal Co., 88 W. Va. 158, 106 S.E.
448 (1921).
13 Irving v. Union Tanning Co., 97 W. Va. 388, 125 S.E. 110 (1924).
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found outside the chapter relating to compensation. 14 These provisions prohibit the employment of minors under sixteen generally,
and prohibits employment in certain industries, such as mining,
dealing in explosives, etc.,-until the age eighteen. This legislation
impliedly sanctions the employment of minors not specifically prohibited, and the "unlawfully employed" provisions of the compensation act are not deemed to exclude such minors from the benefits
and limitations of the act. 15
However, it should be pointed out that the Department of
Labor has promulgated, by authority of statute, rules concerning
persons in a particular age group as being employed in certain
occupations. Rule 28 of the Rules and Regulations of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner provides:
"A ruling by the Commissioner of Labor that the employment
of a particular child is legal will be accepted as final by the
Worlnen's Compensation Commissioner, and protection in
respect to such employment will be granted accordingly."
At the beginning of this subject on employees, a general rule
was given, to-wit, that the word "employee" as it is used in this
section, is applicable to all persons in the service of an employer.
The discussion thus far of some of the definite inclusions and
exclusions has left open the consideration of the general proposition
of the employer-employee relationship and the exclusion of the
independent contractor.
The court held in Basham v. County Court16 that a contract
of employment for remuneration is necessary to constitute the relation of employer and employee under the compensation act. In
distinguishing that relationship from that of independent contractor,
the court said in Crowder v. State Compensation Comnmr,17 that
where services are being rendered by one person for another, it is
ordinarily considered that there exists between them the relation
of employer and employee and not employer and independent
contractor, if the former retains the right to supervise the services,
direct the manner of their execution and summarily discharge the
person rendering the services if the same be not rendered satisfactorily to the employer. This distinction has to be made since
an independent contractor is not an employee as defined and is not
14 W. VA. CODE, ch. 21, art. 6, §§ 1, 2 (Michie 1955).
Adkins v. Hope Engineering & Supply Co., 81 W. Va. 449, 94 S.E.
506 (1917)
15

16 114 W. Va. 376, 171 S.E. 893 (1933).
17 115 W. Va. 12, 174 S.E. 480 (1934).
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insurable against personal injuries to himself by the act while carrying out his independent business.18 It would appear, then, that
in all of these situations, the nature of the contract is primarily
controlling-is it a specific contract to do a particular job or is it
merely a general contract of employment? Second, who has the
right of control over the job as provided in the specific contract?
But, it will apparently make little difference regarding the method
of payment or as to the right to employ or discharge. It is the
control of the job, and probably not as to the general premises,
which is determinative in the final analysis.19
Before leaving this topic, it should be noted that the compensation law applies to employers and employees engaged in interstate commerce under specific terms of the act 2 0
The foregoing is perhaps an incomplete discussion of the
employee aspect in compensation claims, but it does outline the
basic principles used in determining whether the persons involved
are employees within the meaning of the act. If they fail to come
within the general principle or within one of the specific inclusions,
compensation must be denied. A similar result is reached if the
claimant comes within a definite exclusion. However, it is to be
observed that the proportionate number of claims which are rejected
on the ground of the claimant not being an employee within the
meaning of the act is small in relation to the other causes for
rejection.
We have dispensed with what might be termed as the preliminary aspects of a claim and have found that the employee's
application was filed within the requisite period, that he was an
employee within the meaning of the act and that his employer
was a subscriber to the fund at the time of the injury. Now we
turn to the core of our compensation law-the relationship between
the injury and the employment.
The West Virginia Code provides that the Commissioner shall
disburse the Workmen's Compensation Fund to the employees who
shall have received personal injuries in the course of and resulting
from their employment. 2 1 It need not necessarily involve actual
Is Rawson v. Jones-Winifrede Coal Co., 100 W. Va. 263, 132 S.E. 885
(1925).

19 See also, Null v. State Compensation Comm'r, 128 W. Va. 6, 35
S.E.2d 359 (1945); E. C. Klipstein & Sons Co., v. State Compensation

Comm'r, 113 W. Va. 567, 169 S.E. 169 (1933).
20w. VA. CODE ch. 23, art. 2, § 10 (Michie 1955).
21W. V.&. CODE ch. 23, art. 4, § 1 (Michie 1955).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1960

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 4 [1960], Art. 2

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
physical trauma, but may include such conditions as occupational
disease. However, regarding the compensability of the injury
aspect as distinguished from occupational disease, in Montgomery
v. State Compensation Comm's,22 the court stated:
"It is settled law in West Virginia that under the Workmen's Compensation Act disease, whether occupational or not,
is not a personal injury within the meaning of Code, 23-4-1,
and is not compensable, unless it is attributable to a specific
and definite event arising in the course of and resulting from
employment. It is equally well settled in West Virginia that
disease that is attributable to a specific and definite event arising in the course of and resulting from employment, is compensable. [citing cases] On the basis of these decisions, it
is clear that the term 'personal injury' as used in the Workmen's Compensation Act of this state contemplates and includes
the result of unusual exposure, shock, exhaustion, and other
conditions not of traumatic origin provided that they are attributable to a specific and definite event arising in the course
of and resulting from employment."
In any event, the disability for which compensation is sought must
be such as one would reasonably expect to have been incurred
from an occupational incident and, more specifically, such as would
reasonably be expected to have been incurred from the incident as
alleged. Thus, it must have been the result of employment.
It must appear, then, that there is a casual connection between
the conditions under which the work was required to be performed
and the unfortunate ending-the personal injury. It will be, perhaps,
simpler to discuss this element from the standpoint of each of
several classifications.
First, there is unquestioned coverage under the compensation
law where the injury is directly associated with the employment
such as a fractured femur or laceration of the forearm due to
machinery breakage, falling equipment, explosions, slate falls and
the like. These are the simplest to administer and, barring any
extraneous difficulties, they would be handled as a routine matter.
Second, there are those risks which are personal to the employee and which are universally not compensable, as where death
is due solely to natural causes even though the employee was at
work at the time.
Third, there are those which might be called neutral risksthose which have no particular character of employment or personal
22

116 W. Va. 44, 178 S.E. 425 (1935).
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nature. The trend in these cases is to tip the balance in favor of
the employee under the theory that the incident occurred while the
employee was working and there was nothing to show a connection
with the employee personally. Thus, although the work connection
is slight, it is at least stronger than any connection with the
employee's personal life.
Fourth and last, there are the mixed risks which are probably
best illustrated by an aggravation of a pre-existing disability. This
type is perhaps the most difficult of the claims to administer so
some further discussion will be made with respect to this problem.
The basic proposition in this matter as it is now applied in West
Virginia, appears to be erroneously based on a statement made by
Judge Maxwell in a concurring opinion to Caldwell v. Workmen's
Compensation Commr,2 4 wherein an appeal was taken from an
order denying compensation, such order being reversed by the
supreme court pursuant to the majority opinion. Judge Maxwell
stated:
"An employee is certainly none of the less entitled to compensation because he is unfortunate enough to carry on his
body the effects of a former or primary injury, even though
a later injury, being the one for which he seeks compensation,
would not have been so serious but for the lingering effects
of the former."
The Caldwell case has been cited in subsequent cases as authority for this proposition, namely, Martin v. State Compensation
Commr,2 6 which will be discussed later, and Gobel v. State Compensation Comm'r.2 7 The latter case, which involved an existing
arthritis condition, awarded compensation on the basis of the
Caldwell "rule" though there is no syllabus point on the subject.
In Hall v. State CompensationComm'r,2 8 the principal involved
29
was set out in the syllabus as applying to an existing disease.
Thus, it would appear that while the Caldwell case, supra, was
originally erroneously cited for the basic proposition, the principle
has become an established rule of law in West Virginia compensation cases.
Id., at 46, 178 S.E. at 426.
24 106 W. Va. 14, 144 S.E. 568 (1928).
25 Id., at 18, 144 S.E. at 569.
26 107 W. Va. 588, 149 S.E. 824 (1929).
27 111 W. Va. 404,162 S.E. 314 (1932).
28 110 W. Va. 551, 159 S.E. 516 (1931).
20 See Manning v. State Compensation Comm'r, 124 W. Va. 620, 22
23

S.E.2d 299 (1942).
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In Gilbert v. State Compensation Comm'r,3 0 the employee
appealed a ruling denying him compensation for an acute dilatation of his heart allegedly incurred while he was lifting sacks of
grain.. There was no conflicting testimony offered as to his previous good health, with his present condition, according to the
examining physician, not being attributable to anything other than
extreme exertion. Thus, noting that the record shows the disability
to be the result of a definite, isolated and fortuitous occurrence, the
court: stated:
"An acute dilation of a normal heart, superinduced by an unusual lift or strain occurring in the course of and resulting from
employment is a compensable injury within the meaning of
'West Virginia Code 23-4-1."31
However, the Gilbert case is distinguishable from the Martin case,
supra, where the record showed that the deceased shoved a loaded
mine car approximately forty feet "with great effort" and then complained of a pain in his chest. Ten minutes later he was dead. An
autopsy was performed which showed a greatly enlarged heart;
that the heart muscles had undergone fatty degeneration and that
there were many friable negations on the mitral and aortic valves
varying in size. The examining physician stated that though the
proximate cause of death was the exertion involved in moving the
car, such exertion could not have caused death without the existing
organic disease described as a chronic endocarditis of long standing
and chronic rheumatism. In the physician's opinion, anything which
the deceased might have done would have produced the same
result. Martin's widow was denied compensation on the ground
that death was caused by a heart disease and not by an injury
received in the course of and resulting from employment with an
appeal being taken therefrom. The court cited the Caldwell proposition as the well settled rule but went further and stated:
"[T]his does not dispense with the necessity of showing that
the injury was actually caused by accident or an injury received
in the course of and arising from the employment.... Without
analyzing and discussing, [the decisions as cited] it may be
deduced therefrom that compensation will not be awarded
where the employee has chronic heart trouble which has
reached such a stage that death is liable to ensue at anytime,
fTom any exertion and death came while he was doing the
ordinary work of his employment... In compensation cases,
30

121 W. Va. 10, 1 S.E.2d 167 (1939).
31Id., at SyL 1.
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as in other cases, the familiar rule is applicable that the burden
of proving that there was an injury is upon the applicant and
where the evidence is equally consistent with an injury or no
injury, the burden is not discharged. In the case under consideration, there were no external or internal marks or evidence
of injury. Moreover, it was shown that moving loaded cars was
not unusual, although coal loaders were not required to do
so. It was the ordinary and not the unusual labor which he
was performing." 32
Thus, the court affirmed the ruling denying compensation and, in
the later Gilbert case, supra, distinguished the two situations on the
basis of Martin's chronic heart condition thus, though he did die
in the course of his employment, he did not die as a result therefrom.
Therefore, in the Martin case, supra, the risk was deemed personal
to the employee. 33
The foregoing has been a summary discussion of the "result
of employment" element as relating to the origin or cause of the
personal injury. Other than casual reference, there has been no
previous mention in this paper to another important factor-the
"course of employment" requirement as related to the time, place
and circumstances or activity out of which the alleged incident
occurred.
It must then be determined whether the personal injury was
incurred within the period of employment, at a place where the
employee was reasonably expected to be (zone of employment)
and while he was fulfilling his duties or engaged in doing something
incidental thereto (scope of employment). This is a necessary
element of compensability just as the "result of employment" element
was, since our court has conclusively established that these two
phrases are not synonymous. It is absolutely necessary that both
exist concurrently and simultaneously, for one without the other
34
will not sustain an award of compensation.
There have been numerous cases decided by our supreme court
on the issue of "course of employment" and no attempt will be
32

Martin v. State Compensation Comm'r, 107 W. Va. 583, 587, 149

S.E. 824, 826 (1929).

33 See Williams v. State Compensation Conm'r, 127 W. Va. 78, 31
S.E.2d 546 (1944) for an exhaustive discussion on heat prostration or ex-

haustion cases inwhich the court said that the same basic rules would apply
to heart cases.
34 See Dameron v. State Compensation Comm'r, 109 W. Va. 343, 155

S.E. 119 (1930); Archibald v. Workmen's Compensation Commr, 77 W. Va.
448, 87 S.E. 791 (1916).
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made to cite them all. However, to illustrate the three components
of this basic element, the following cases are submitted for consideration.
In De Constantin v. Public Service Comm'n,3 5 the court said
that employment is not limited to the exact moment of arrival at
the place of work nor to the moment of retirement therefrom. It
includes a reasonable amount of time before and after actual work.
30
Similarily, the court in Miller v. State Compensation Comm'r,
stated that it was the well established rule, justified by our liberal
construction of the compensation law in favor of employees, that
injuries incurred while making use of plant facilities, immediately
connected in point of time with a day's work, are compensable.
Thus, it may be concluded that the personal injury need not
have occurred between the hours of nine and five in order to meet
this requirement but could occur some period of time before or
after the day's work depending on the circumstances of the particular situation.
Second, it is the general rule that the employer's responsibility
under the compensation act is limited to injuries incurred on his
premises.3 7 However, this general proposition is subject to its exceptions and the best case discussing the points to be considered is
Carperv. State Compensation Comm'r.38 In analyzing its previous
decisions, the West Virginia Supreme Court makes the following
deductions:
"1. Compensation may be allowed for injuries sustained
by an employee while going to or from work, if sustained within
the zone of his employment;
2. No definite rule can be laid down as to what is the zone
of employment, and each case must be decided on its own facts
and circumstances;
3. Injuries sustained on public highways, while traveling
the same in common with the general public, are not, in the
absence of special circumstances or contract requirements,
compensable;
4. Whether or not an injury is compensable is not determined alone by its occurrence on or off the premises of the
employer; and
5. The term 'zone of employment'
39 implies reasonable
proximity to the place of employment."
3575 W. Va. 32, 83 S.E. 88 (1914).

36 126
37 See
38 121
39 Id.,

W. Va. 78, 27 S.E. 586 (1943).
Wilkin v. H. Koppers Co. 84 W. Va. 460, 100 S.E. 300 (1919).
W. Va. 1, 1 S.E.2d 165 (1939).
at 3, 1 S.E.2d at 166.
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In that case it was found that miner's residences owned by the
employer and leased to his employees, and roads leading thereto,
which were separate and apart from the plant equipment and facilities of the mine, were not within the employees' zone of employment, for while the injury might have been incurred on the employer's property as related to ownership, it was not incurred on
his premises pursuant to the reasonable interpretation placed
thereon.
In Evans v. State Compensation Commrr,40 however, the court
used the basic principles set out in the Carper case, supra, and distinguished it in holding that a private road connecting different
parts of a coal mining plant and used by employees in going to and
from their work, is within the employee's zone of employment.
The case of Canoy v. State Compensation Commfr,4 1 illustrates
a public highway situation wherein the court stated that an injury
or death of an employee occurring on a public highway and not on
the premises of the employer gives right to participate in the fund
when the place of injury was brought within the scope (zone) of
employment by an express or implied requirement of the contract
of employment of its use by the employee in going to and returning
from work. This is an example of point three as taken from the
Carper case, supra.
Thus, compensation is not to be denied simply because the
occurrence did not take place on the employer's premises, and each
case must again be decided on its own facts and circumstances.
Finally, the personal injury must have been incurred while the
employee was fulfilling his duties or engaged in doing something
incidental thereto. This component of "course of employment"
may be best illustrated by the following situations although these
going to and from work cases are likewise appropriate.
In Archibald v. Workman's Compensation Comm'r,42 the court
held that acts of ministration by an employee unto -himself, such
as quenching his thirst, relieving his hunger, protecting himself
from excessive cold, etc., the performance of which occurs while he
is at work and which are readily conceivable to be reasonably necessary to his health and comfort, are incidental of his employment
40 124 W. Va. 336,20 S.E.2d 172 (1942).
4 113 W. Va. 914, 170 S.E. 184 (1933).
42 77 W. Va. 448, 87 S.E. 791 (1916).
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within the meaning of the compensation act Thus, an accidental
injury sustained in the performance of such an act is compensable
even though the act engaged in was, in a sense, merely personal
to himself and only remotely and indirectly necessary to the object
of employment.
In Williams vs. State Compensation Commr,43 a similar result
was reached when an employee, during his lunch hour, was injured
while going for a drink of water. The court found such an injury,
being sustained at that particular time and while on the employer's
premises with the direct or implied knowledge and consent of
the employer, to be compensable. In addition to meeting the
other requirements, the employee was still within the scope of his
employment.
As is readily observed, the phrases "course of employment"
and "resulting from employment" and their various components
are rather difficult to distinguish and consider separately. As a
practical matter, detailed and categorical analysis of each of the
factors previously mentioned is unnecessary with the great majority
of claims. The pieces of the average claim fit in nicely with the
overall puzzle and, if there is a unique question involved, it will
ordinarily stand out like the proverbial sore thumb. It is only in
these exceptional situations that knowledge of the particular facts
and the applicable law is necessary to analyze the circumstances
and determine how it affects the compensability of the claim.
There is one portion of chapter 23 which warrants consideration. Reference is made to article 4, section 2 of the compensation
act which states in part that no employee shall be entitled to receive
any benefits from the fund on account of any personal injury caused
by wilful misconduct, wilful disobedience to such rules and regulations as may be properly adopted, intoxication, or the failure to
use properly prescribed protective or safety appliances. The limitations expressed in this section are more theoretical than actual,
since, as a practical matter, they are exceedingly difficult to establish.
Under this section it would appear to be established that if an
employee should do some act which he has been instructed not to
do or if he should perform some act outside the realm of his assigned
duties, and is injured as a result of that action, he did so at his own
peril and is precluded from being compensated therefor subject, of
course, to the "impulsive or spontaneous act" theory.
43 114 W. Va. 37, 170 S.E. 775 (1933).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol62/iss4/2

14

De La Mater: A Brief Survey of the West Virginia Law of Compensability

WEST VIRGINIA LAW OF COMPENSABILITY

Admittedly, mere violations of instructions and the doing of
hazardous acts are not, of themselves, wilful misconduct as a matter
of law, so as to preclude compensation under our statute. But either
the intentional doing of an act with the knowledge that it is likely
to result in injury, or acting with wanton and reckless disregard of
possible consequences, combined with the violation of instructions,
is sufficient to constitute wilful misconduct within the meaning of
44
the act.
A reference should be made to section 7 of article 4 of the
compensation act wherein the legislature set out specific requirements in all hernia claims as follows:
"In all claims for compensation for hernia resulting from personal injury received in the course of and resulting from
employment, it must be definitely proven to the satisfaction of
the Commissioner:
First, that there was an injury resulting in hernia;
Second, that the hernia appeared suddenly;
Third, that it was accompanied by pain;
Fourth, that the hernia immediately followed an injury;
Fifth, that the hernia did not exist prior to the injury for
which compensation is claimed....'
Most of the cases involving this type of claim turn on the evidence
of the existence or nonexistence of a pre-existing hernia and the
prevailing rule appears to put the burden on the employee to
produce medical proof as to the non-existing hernia even though
there is no evidence to the contrary. However, where there is a
conflict with respect to an injury, it must be resolved in favor of
the employee, although there are no cases directly in point regard45
ing the first four requirements.
44 See Ragle v. State Compensation Comm'r, 125 W. Va. 450, 24 S.E.2d
756 (1948); Red Jacket Consol. Coal & Coke Co., v. State Compensation
Comm'r, 111 W. Va. 425, 162 S.E.
66524 (1932).
also, Stevely v. State
(1948).
S.E.2d 95See
Compensation Comm'r, 125 W. Va. 308,
45 See Szalay v. State Compensation Comm'r, 127 W. Va. 449, 88 S.E.2d
286 (19455; Rapp v. State Compensation Comm'r, 126 W. Va. 227, 27 S.E.2d
588 (1943); Jordan v. State Compensation Comm'r, 120 W. Va. 142, 197 S.E.
20 (1938); Aniel v. State Compensation Comm'r, 112 W. Va. 645, 166 S.E. 366
(1932); Pollardi v. Public Service Comm'r, 75 W. Va. 542, 84 S.E. 242 (1915).
The remaining portion of W. VA. CoDE, ch. 23, art. 4, § 7 (Michie 1955)
deals with the requirement that the employee submit to a radical operation and
the benefits allowed from the fund. Dealing with this provision, see, Johnson
v. State Compensation Comm'r, 128 W. Va. 87, 35 S.E.2d 677 (1945); Shrewsbury v. State Compensation Comm'r, 127 W. Va. 360, 32 S.E.2d 361 (1944);
Cole v. State Compensation Comm'r, 113 W. Va. 579, 169 S.E. 165 (1933);
Myers v. State Compensation Commr, 113 W. Va. 316, 167 S.E. 740 (1933);
Myers v. State Compensation Coim'r, 110 W. Va. 425, 158 S.E. 512 (1931).
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What has been attempted here is a summary of some of the
major problems found in the West Virginia law of compensability,
relating to timeliness of claims, the requirements of employeremployee relationship, and the casual connection between employment and injury. Within the limits of this undertaking exhaustive
treatment of these problems would have been inappropriate, yet
it is hoped that a better understanding of this complex subject has
been accomplished.
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